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RESEARCH
Publication bias and the
canonization of false facts
Abstract Science is facing a “replication crisis” in which many experimental findings cannot be
replicated and are likely to be false. Does this imply that many scientific facts are false as well? To find
out, we explore the process by which a claim becomes fact. We model the community’s confidence in
a claim as a Markov process with successive published results shifting the degree of belief.
Publication bias in favor of positive findings influences the distribution of published results. We find
that unless a sufficient fraction of negative results are published, false claims frequently can become
canonized as fact. Data-dredging, p-hacking, and similar behaviors exacerbate the problem. Should
negative results become easier to publish as a claim approaches acceptance as a fact, however, true
and false claims would be more readily distinguished. To the degree that the model reflects the real
world, there may be serious concerns about the validity of purported facts in some disciplines.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.001
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Introduction
Science is a process of collective knowledge cre-
ation in which researchers use experimental, the-
oretical and observational approaches to
develop a naturalistic understanding of the
world. In the development of a scientific field,
certain claims stand out as both significant and
stable in the face of further experimentation
(Ravetz, 1971). Once a claim reaches this stage
of widespread acceptance as true, it has transi-
tioned from claim to fact. This transition, which
we call canonization, is often indicated by some
or all of the following: a canonized fact can be
taken for granted rather than treated as an open
hypothesis in the subsequent primary literature;
tests that do no more than to confirm previously
canonized facts are seldom considered publica-
tion-worthy; and canonized facts begin to
appear in review papers and textbooks without
the company of alternative hypotheses. Of
course the veracity of so-called facts may be
called back into question (Arbesman, 2012;
Latour, 1987), but for time being the issue is
considered to be settled. Note that we consider
facts to be epistemological rather than ontologi-
cal: a claim is a fact because it is accepted by
the relevant community, not because it
accurately reflects or represents underlying
physical reality (Ravetz, 1971; Latour, 1987).
But what is the status of these facts in light of
the widely reported replication crisis in science?
Large scale analyses have revealed that many
published papers in fields ranging from cancer
biology to psychology to economics cannot be
replicated in subsequent experiments
(Begley and Ellis, 2012; Open Science Collabo-
ration, 2015; Errington et al., 2014;
Ebrahim et al., 2014; Chang and Li, 2015;
Camerer et al., 2016; Baker, 2016). One possi-
ble explanation is that many published experi-
ments are not replicable because many of their
conclusions are ontologically false (Ioanni-
dis, 2005; Higginson and Munafo`, 2016).
If many experimental findings are ontologi-
cally false, does it follow that many scientific
facts are ontologically untrue? Not necessarily.
Claims of the sort that become facts are rarely if
ever tested directly in their entirety. Instead,
such claims typically comprise multiple subsidi-
ary hypotheses which must be individually veri-
fied. Thus multiple experiments are usually
required to establish a claim. Some of these may
include direct replications, but more typically an
ensemble of distinct experiments will produce
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multiple lines of evidence before a claim is
accepted by the community.
For example, as molecular biologists worked
to unravel the details of the eukaryotic RNA
interference (RNAi) pathway in the early 2000s,
they wanted to understand how the RNAi path-
way was initiated. Based on work with Drosoph-
ila cell lines and embryo extracts, one group of
researchers made the claim that the RNAi path-
way is initiated by the Dicer enzyme which slices
double-stranded RNA into short fragments of
20–22 amino acids in length (Bernstein et al.,
2001). Like many scientific facts, this claim was
too broad to be validated directly in a single
experiment. Rather, it comprised a number of
subsidiary assertions: an enzyme called Dicer
exists in eukaryotic cells; it is essential to initiate
the RNAi pathway; it binds dsRNA and slices it
into pieces; it is distinct from the enzyme or
enzyme complex that destroys targeted messen-
ger RNA; it is ubiquitous across eukaryotes that
exhibit RNAi pathway. Researchers from numer-
ous labs tested these subsidiary hypotheses or
aspects thereof to derive numerous lines of con-
vergent evidence in support of the original
claim. While the initial breakthrough came from
work in Drosophila melanogaster cell lines
((Bernstein et al., (2001), subsequent research
involved in establishing this fact drew upon in
vitro and in vivo studies, genomic analyses, and
even mathematical modeling efforts, and
spanned species including the fission yeast
Schizosaccharomyces pombe, the protozoan
Giardia intestinalis, the nemotode Caenorhabdi-
tis elegans, the flowering plant Arabidopsis thali-
ana, mice, and humans (Jaskiewicz and
Filipowicz, 2008). Ultimately, sufficient support-
ing evidence accumulated to establish as fact
the original claim about Dicer’s function.
Requiring multiple studies to establish a fact
is no panacea, however. The same processes
that allow publication of a single incorrect result
can also lead to the accumulation of sufficiently
many incorrect findings to establish a false claim
as fact (McElreath and Smaldino, 2015).
This risk is exacerbated by publication bias
(Sterling, 1959; Rosenthal, 1979; New-
combe, 1987; Begg and Berlin, 1988; Dicker-
sin, 1990; Easterbrook et al., 1991;
Song et al., 2000; Olson et al., 2002; Chan and
Altman, 2005; Franco et al., 2014). Publication
bias arises when the probability that a scientific
study is published is not independent of its
results (Sterling, 1959). As a consequence, the
findings from published tests of a claim will dif-
fer in a systematic way from the findings of all
tests of the same claim (Song et al., 2000;
Turner et al., 2008).
Publication bias is pervasive. Authors have
systematic biases regarding which results they
consider worth writing up; this is known as the
“file drawer problem” or “outcome reporting
bias” (Rosenthal, 1979; Chan and Altman,
2005). Journals similarly have biases about
which results are worth publishing. These two
sources of publication bias act equivalently in
the model developed here, and thus we will not
attempt to separate them. Nor would separating
them be simple; even if authors’ behavior is the
larger contributor to publication bias
(Olson et al., 2002; Franco et al., 2014), they
may simply be responding appropriately to
incentives imposed by editorial preferences for
positive results.
What kinds of results are most valued? Find-
ings of statistically significant differences
between groups or treatments tend to be
viewed as more worthy of submission and publi-
cation than those of non-significant differences.
Correlations between variables are often consid-
ered more interesting than the absence of corre-
lations. Tests that reject null hypotheses are
commonly seen as more noteworthy than tests
that fail to do so. Results that are interesting in
any of these ways can be described as
“positive”.
A substantial majority of the scientific results
published appear to be positive ones
(Csada et al., 1996). It is relatively straightfor-
ward to measure the fraction of published
results that are negative. One extensive study
found that in 2007, more than 80% of papers
reported positive findings, and this number
exceeded 90% in disciplines such as psychology
and ecology (Fanelli, 2012). Moreover, the frac-
tion of publications reporting positive results has
increased over the past few decades. While this
high prevalence of positive results could in prin-
ciple result in part from experimental designs
with increasing statistical power and a growing
preference for testing claims that are believed
likely to be true, publication bias doubtless con-
tributes as well (Fanelli, 2012).
How sizable is this publication bias? To
answer that, we need to estimate the fraction of
negative results that are published, and doing
so can be difficult because we rarely have access
to the set of findings that go unpublished. The
best available evidence of this sort comes from
registered clinical trials. For example, a 2008
meta-analysis examined 74 FDA-registered stud-
ies of antidepressants (Turner et al., 2008). In
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that analysis, 37 of 38 positive studies were pub-
lished as positive results, but only 3 of 24 nega-
tive studies were published as negative results.
An additional 5 negative studies were re-framed
as positive for the purposes of publication. Thus,
negative studies were published at scarcely
more than 10% the rate of positive studies.
We would like to understand how the possi-
bility of misleading experimental results and the
prevalence of publication bias shape the crea-
tion of scientific facts. Mathematical models of
the scientific process can help us understand the
dynamics by which scientific knowledge is pro-
duced and, consequently, the likelihood that ele-
ments of this knowledge are actually correct. In
this paper, we look at the way in which repeated
efforts to test a scientific claim establish this
claim as fact or cause it to be rejected as false.
We develop a mathematical model in which
successive publications influence the commun-
ity’s perceptions around the likelihood of a given
scientific claim. Positive results impel the claim
toward fact, whereas negative results lead in the
opposite direction. Describing this process,
Latour, (1987) compared the fate of a scientific
claim to that of a rugby ball, pushed alternatively
toward fact or falsehood by the efforts of com-
peting teams, its fate determined by the balance
of their collective actions. Put in these terms, our
aim in the present paper is to develop a formal
model of how the ball is driven up and down the
epistemological pitch until one of the goal lines
is reached. In the subsequent sections, we out-
line the model, explain how it can be analyzed,
present the results that we obtain, and consider
its implications for the functioning of scientific
activity.
Model
In this section, we will develop a simplified
model of scientific activity, designed to capture
the important qualitative features of fact-crea-
tion as a dynamic process.
Model description
We explore a simple model in which researchers
sequentially test a single claim until the scientific
community becomes sufficiently certain of its
truth or falsehood that no further experimenta-
tion is needed. Our model is conceptually
related to those developed in refs.
(Rzhetsky et al., 2006; McElreath and Smal-
dino, 2015), though it is considerably simpler
than either since we only consider a single claim
at a time.
Figure 1 provides a schematic illustration of
the experimentation and publication process.
We begin with a claim which is ontologically
either true or false. Researchers sequentially
conduct experiments to test the claim; these
experiments are typically not direct replications
of one another, but rather distinct approaches
that lend broader support to the claim. Each
experiment returns either a positive outcome
supporting the claim, or a negative outcome
contravening it. For mathematical simplicity, we
assume all tests to have the same error rates, in
the sense that if the claim under scrutiny is false,
then investigators obtain false positives with
probability a. Conversely, when the claim is true,
investigators obtain false negatives with proba-
bility b. We take these error rates to be the ones
that are conventionally associated with statistical
hypothesis testing, so that a is equivalent to the
significance level (technically, the size) of a statis-
tical test and 1! b is the test’s power. We
assume that, as in any reasonable test, a true
claim is more likely to generate a positive result
than a negative one: 1! b>a. A broader inter-
pretation of a and b beyond statistical error
does not change the interpretation of our
results.
After completing a study, the investigators
may attempt to publish their experimental
results. However, publication bias occurs in that
the result of the experiment influences the
chance that a study is written up as a paper and
accepted for publication. Positive results are
eventually published somewhere with probability
!1 whereas negative results are eventually pub-
lished somewhere with probability !0. Given the
reluctance of authors to submit negative results
and of journals to publish them, we expect that
in general !1>!0.
Finally, readers attempt to judge whether a
claim is true by consulting the published litera-
ture only. For modeling purposes, we will con-
sider a best-case scenario, in which the false
positive and false negative rates a and b are
established by disciplinary custom or accepted
benchmarks, and readers perform Bayesian
updating of their beliefs based upon these
known values. In practice, these values may not
be as well standardized or widely reported as
would be desirable. Moreover, readers are
unlikely to be this sophisticated in drawing their
inferences. Instead readers are likely to form
subjective beliefs in an informal fashion based
on a general assessment of the accumulated
positive and negative results and the strength of
each. But the Bayesian updating case provides a
Nissen et al. eLife 2016;5:e21451. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451 3 of 19
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well-defined model under which to explore the
distortion of belief by publication bias.
The problem is that the results described in
the published literature are now biased by the
selection of which articles are drafted and
accepted for publication. We assume that read-
ers are unaware of the degree of this bias, and
that they fail to correct for publication bias in
drawing inferences from the published data. It
may seem pessimistic that researchers would fail
to make this correction, but much of the current
concern over the replication crisis in science is
predicated on exactly this. Moreover, it is usually
impossible for a researcher to accurately esti-
mate the degree of publication bias in a given
domain.
Model dynamics
Consider a claim that the community initially
considers to have probability q0 of being true.
Researchers iteratively test hypotheses that bear
upon the claim until it accumulates either suffi-
cient support to be canonized as fact, or suffi-
cient counter-evidence to be discarded as false.
If the claim is true, the probability that a single
test leads to a positive publication is ð1! bÞ!1,
and the corresponding probability of a negative
publication is b!0. The remaining probability cor-
responds to results of the test not being pub-
lished. If the claim is false, these probabilities
are a!1 and ð1! aÞ!0 for positive and negative
published outcomes, respectively. Given that a
claim is true, the probability that a published
test of that claim reports a positive outcome is
therefore
!T ¼
ð1!bÞ!1
ð1!bÞ!1þb!0
: (1)
For a false claim, the probability that a pub-
lished test is positive is
!F ¼
a!1
a!1þð1!aÞ!0
: (2)
Because only the ratio of !1 to !0 matters for
the purposes of our model, we set !1 to 1 for
the remainder of the paper. We initially assume
that !0 is constant, but will relax this assumption
later.
Figure 1. Conducting and reporting the test of a claim. In our model, a scientific claim is either true or false.
Researchers conduct an experiment which either supports or fails to the support the claim. True claims are
correctly supported with probability 1! b while false claims are incorrectly supported with probability a. Next, the
researchers may attempt to publish their results. Positive results that support the claim are published with
probability !1 whereas negative results that fail to support the claim are published with probability !0. This process
then repeats, with additional experiments conducted until the claim is canonized as fact or rejected as false.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.002
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To formalize ideas, consider a sequence of
published outcomes X, and let Yk be the number
of positive published outcomes in the first k
terms of X. When the probability of publishing a
negative result !0 is constant, the outcomes of
published experiments are exchangeable ran-
dom variables. Thus after k published tests, the
distribution of Yk for a true claim is the binomial
distribution Binðk; !TÞ and for a false claim is
Binðk; !FÞ. Moreover, the sequence Ykf g
¥
k¼1 is a
Markov chain. When the extent of publication
bias is known, we can compute the conditional
probability that a claim is true, given Yk ¼ y, as
!yTð1!!TÞ
k!y
q0
!yTð1!!TÞ
k!yq0þ!
y
Fð1!!FÞ
k!yð1! q0Þ
: (3)
We now consider the consequences of draw-
ing inferences based on the published data
alone, without correcting for publication bias.
For model readers who do not condition on
publication bias, let qkðyÞ be the perceived, con-
ditional probability that a claim is true given
Yk ¼ y. We say “perceived” because these read-
ers use Bayes’ Law to update qk, but do so
under the incorrect assumption that there is no
publication bias, i.e., that !0 ¼ !1 ¼ 1. To ease
the narrative, we refer to the perceived condi-
tional probability that a claim is true as the
“belief” that the claim is true. Expressing this
formally,
qkðyÞ ¼
ð1!bÞybk!yq0
ð1!bÞybk!yq0þayð1!aÞ
k!yð1! q0Þ
: (4)
Note that without publication bias, we have
!T ¼ ð1!bÞ and !F ¼ a, and thus Equation 3
coincides with Equation 4.
From the perspective of an observer who is
unaware of any publication bias, the pair ðYk; kÞ
is a sufficient statistic for the random variable
A 2 fTrue;Falseg representing the truth value of
the claim in question. This follows from the defi-
nition of statistical sufficiency and the fact that
prob A¼TruejYk;k; Yif g
k
i¼1
h i
¼ qkðyÞ
¼ prob A¼TruejYk;k½ ':
By analogous logic, the pair ðYk;kÞ is also a
sufficient statistic for an observer aware of the
degree of publication bias provided that the
publication probabilities !0 and !1 are constant.
We envision science as proceeding iteratively
until the belief that a claim is true is sufficiently
close to 1 that the claim is canonized as fact, or
until belief is sufficiently close to 0 that the claim
is discarded as false. We let t0 and t1 be the
belief thresholds at which a claim is rejected or
canonized as fact, respectively (0<t0<t1<1), and
refer to these as evidentiary standards. In our
analysis, we make the simplifying assumption
that the evidentiary standards are symmetric, i.
e., t0 ¼ 1! t1. We describe the consequences of
relaxing this assumption in the Discussion.
Thus, mathematically, we model belief in the
truth of a claim as a discrete-time Markov chain
qkf g
¥
k¼0 with absorbing boundaries at the eviden-
tiary standards for canonization or rejection
(Figure 2A). When the Markov chain represents
belief, its possible values lie in the interval from
0 to 1. For mathematical convenience, however,
it is often helpful to convert belief to the log
odds scale, that is, lnðqk=ð1! qkÞÞ. Some algebra
shows that the log odds of belief qkðyÞ can be
written as
ln
qkðyÞ
1! qkðyÞ
! "
¼ y ln 1!b
a
# $
þðk! yÞ ln b
1!a
# $
þ ln q0
1!q0
% &
:
(5)
The log odds scale is convenient because, as
Equation. 5 shows, each published positive out-
come increases the log odds of belief by a con-
stant increment
d1 ¼ ln
1!b
a
! "
>0
(Figure 2B). Each published negative out-
come decreases the log odds of belief by
d0 ¼ ln
b
1!a
! "
<0:
Below, we will see that much of the behavior
of our model can be understood in terms of the
expected change in the log odds of belief for
each published outcome. For a true claim, the
expected change in the log odds of belief is
d1!T þ d0ð1!!TÞ (6)
whereas for a false claim, the expected change
in the log odds of belief is
d1!F þ d0ð1!!FÞ: (7)
Computing canonization and rejection
probabilities
In general, we cannot obtain a closed-form
expression for the probability that a claim is can-
onized as fact or for the probability that it is
rejected as false. We can, however, derive recur-
sive expressions for the probabilities that after k
published experiments a claim has been
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canonized as fact, has been discarded as false,
or remains undecided. From these, it is straight-
forward to compute the canonization and rejec-
tion probabilities numerically to any desired
level of precision.
For each number of published experiments k,
the state space for Yk is simply Yk 2 0; 1; . . . ; kf g.
Partition this state space as follows:
Ck ¼ y : qkðyÞ>t1f g
I k ¼ y : qkðyÞ2 t0;t1½ 'f g
Rk ¼ y : qkðyÞ<t0f g:
That is, Ck is the set of outcomes correspond-
ing to a belief greater than the evidentiary stan-
dard for canonization, Rk is the set of outcomes
corresponding to a belief less than the eviden-
tiary standard for rejection, and I k is the set of
outcomes corresponding to belief in between
these two standards (the “interior”). Let T be
the number of publications until a claim is either
canonized or rejected. Formally,
T ¼min k : Yk 2Ck [Rkf g:
For a true claim, we calculate the probability
of canonization as follows. (A parallel set of
equations gives the probability of canonization
for a false claim.) For each y2 I k, define
pkðyÞ ¼Prob Yk ¼ y;Tf g. That is, pkðyÞ is the prob-
ability that there are exactly y positive outcomes
in the first k publications, and the claim has yet
to be canonized or rejected by publication k.
Suppose these probabilities are known for each
y2 I k. Then for each y2 I kþ1, these probabilities
can be found recursively by
pkþ1ðyÞ ¼ !T pkðy! 1Þþ ð1!!TÞpkðyÞ:
For computational purposes, in the recursion
above we define pkðyÞ ¼ 0 whenever y=2I k. The
probability that the claim has yet to be canon-
ized or rejected by publication k is simply
Prob T>kf g¼
X
y2I k
pkðyÞ:
Let fk be the probability that a claim is first
canonized at publication k. Formally,
fk ¼
X
y:y!12I k!1 and y2Ck
!T pk!1ðy! 1Þ:
Let k$ be the smallest value of k for which
Figure 2. A time-directed graph represents the evolution of belief over time. In panel A, the horizontal axis
indicates the number of experiments published and the vertical axis reflects the observer’s belief, quantified as the
probability that the claim is true. The process begins at the single point at far left with an initial belief q0. Each
subsequent experiment either supports the claim, moving to the next node up and right, or contradicts the claim,
moving to the next node down and right. At yellow nodes, the status of the claim is as yet undecided. At green
nodes, it is canonized as fact, and at blue nodes, it is rejected as false. The black horizontal lines show the
evidentiary standards (t0 and t1). The red path shows one possible trajectory, in which a positive experiment is
followed by a negative, then two positives, then a negative, etc., ultimately becoming canonized as fact when it
reaches the upper boundary. Panel B shows the same network, but with the vertical axis representing log odds
and using color to indicate the probability that the process visits each node. In log-odds space, each published
positive result shifts belief by the constant distance d1>0 and each negative result by a different distance d0<0.
Shown here (in both panel A and B) is a false claim with false positive rate a ¼ 0:2, false negative rate b ¼ 0:4,
publication probabilities p0 ¼ 0:1 and p1 ¼ 1, and initial belief q0 ¼ 0:1. In this case, the claim is likely to be
canonized as fact, despite being false.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.003
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Prob Tf g( ". To calculate the probability of can-
onization, we calculate pkðyÞ for all k¼ 1; . . . ;k$.
The probability of canonization is then
Pk$
k¼1fk.
For the analyses in this paper, we have set
"¼ 10!4.
Results
We focus throughout the paper on the dynamic
processes by which false claims are canonized as
facts, and explore how the probability of this
happening depends on properties of the system
such as the publication rate of negative results,
the initial beliefs of researchers, the rates of
experimental error, and the degree of evidence
required to canonize a claim. In principle, the
converse could be a problem as well: true claims
could be discarded as false. However, this is rare
in our model. Publication bias favors the publica-
tion of positive results and therefore will not
tend to cause true claims to be discarded as
false, irrespective of other parameters. We first
establish this, and then proceed to a detailed
examination of how scientific experimentation
and publication influences the rate at which false
claims are canonized as fact.
True claims tend to be canonized as facts
In our model, true claims are almost always can-
onized as facts. Figure 3 illustrates this result in
the form of a receiver operating characteristic
(ROC) curve. Holding the other parameters con-
stant, the curve varies the negative publication
rate !0, and uses the vertical and horizontal axes
to indicate the probabilities that true and false
claims respectively are canonized as fact.
One might fear that as the probability !0 of
publishing negative results climbs toward unity,
the risk of rejecting a true claim would increase
dramatically as well. This is not the case. Even as
the probability of publishing negative results
approaches 1, the risk of rejecting a true claim is
low when evidentiary standards are lax
(Figure 3A), and negligible when evidentiary
standards are strict (Figure 3B).
This result turns out to be general across a
broad range of parameters. Assuming the mild
requirements that (i) tests of a true claim are
more likely to result in positive publications than
negative publications (i.e., !T>1=2, or equiva-
lently ð1! bÞ>b!0), and (ii) positive published
outcomes increase belief that the claim is true
(d1>0, or equivalently ð1! bÞ>a), true claims are
highly likely to be canonized as facts. The excep-
tions occur only when minimal evidence is
Figure 3. ROC curves reveal that true claims are almost always canonized as fact. In the receiver operating
characteristic (ROC) curves shown here, the vertical axis represents the probability that a true claim is correctly
canonized as fact, and the horizontal axis represents the probability that a false one is incorrectly canonized as
fact. Panel A: lax evidentiary standards t0 ¼ 0:1 and t1 ¼ 0:9. Panel B: strict evidentiary standards t0 ¼ 0:001 and
t1 ¼ 0:999. Error rates and initial belief are a ¼ 0:05, b ¼ 0:2, and q0 ¼ 0:5. Each point along the ROC curve
corresponds to a different value of the negative publication rate, !0, as indicated by color. Grey regions of the
curve correspond to the unlikely situations in which !0>!1 ¼ 1, i.e., negative results are more likely to be published
than positive ones. The figures reveal two important points. First, when negative results are published at any rate
!0 ( 1, the vast majority of true claims are canonized as fact. Second, when negative results are published at a low
rate (!0 less than 0.3 or 0.2 depending on evidentiary standards), many false claims will also be canonized as true.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.004
Nissen et al. eLife 2016;5:e21451. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451 7 of 19
Feature article Research Publication bias and the canonization of false facts
needed to discard a claim, i.e., when initial belief
is small (q0 » t0). In such cases a bit of bad luck—
the first one or two published experiments
report false negatives, for example—can cause a
true claim to be rejected. But otherwise, truth is
sufficient for canonization.
Unfortunately, truth is not required for canon-
ization. The risk of canonizing a false claim—
shown on the horizontal axis in Figure 3—is
highly sensitive to the rate at which negative
results are published. When negative results are
published with high probability, false claims are
seldom canonized. But when negative results are
published with lower probability, many false
claims are canonized.
Thus we see that the predominant risk associ-
ated with publication bias is the canonization of
false claims. In the remainder of this analysis, we
focus on this risk of incorrectly establishing a
false claim as a fact.
Publication of negative results is essential
As we discussed in the introduction, authors and
journals alike tend to be reluctant to publish
negative results, and as we found in the previous
subsection, when most negative results go
unpublished, science performs poorly. Here, we
explore this relationship in further detail.
Figure 4 shows how the probability of erro-
neously canonizing a false claim as fact depends
on the probability !0 that a negative result is
published. False claims are likely to be canon-
ized below a threshold rate of negative publica-
tion, and unlikely to be canonized above this
threshold. For example, when the false positive
rate a is 0.05, the false negative rate b is 0.4,
Figure 4. Publishing negative outcomes is essential for rejecting false claims. Probability that a false claim is
incorrectly canonized, as a function of the negative publication rate. Throughout, initial belief is q0 ¼ 0:5, and
individual data series show false positive rates a ¼ 0:05 (yellow), 0:10; . . . ; 0:25 (red). Top row: weak evidentiary
standards t0 ¼ 0:1 and t1 ¼ 0:9. Panel A: false negative rate b ¼ 0:2. Panel B: b ¼ 0:4. Panels C–D: similar to
panels A–B, with more demanding evidentiary standards t0 ¼ 0:001 and t1 ¼ 0:999.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.005
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and the evidentiary requirements are strong (yel-
low points in Panel 4D), a false claim is likely to
be canonized as fact unless negative results are
at least 20% as likely as positive results to be
published.
Figure 4 also reveals that the probability of
canonizing false claims as facts depends strongly
on both the false positive rate and the false neg-
ative rate of the experimental tests. As these
error rates increase, an increasingly large frac-
tion of negative results must be published to
preserve the ability to discriminate between true
and false claims.
Initial beliefs usually do not matter much
If the scientific process is working properly, it
should not automatically confirm what we
already believe, but rather it should lead us to
change our beliefs based on evidence. Our
model indicates that in general, this is the case.
Figure 5 shows how the probability that a
false claim is canonized as true depends on the
initial belief q0 that the claim is true. Under most
circumstances, the probability of canonization is
relatively insensitive to initial belief. False canoni-
zation rates depend strongly on initial belief only
when evidentiary standards are weak and experi-
ments are highly prone to error (Figure 5B). In
this case, belief is a random walk without a sys-
tematic tendency to increase or decrease with
each published outcome, and thus the odds of
canonization or rejection depend most strongly
on the initial belief.
Figure 5. False canonization rates are relatively insensitive to initial belief, unless experimental tests are inaccurate
and evidentiary standards are weak. Probability that a false claim is mistakenly canonized as a true fact vs. prior
belief for various negative publication rates. Top row: weak evidentiary standards t0 ¼ 0:1 and t1 ¼ 0:9. Panel A:
false positive rate a ¼ 0:05, false negative rate b ¼ 0:2, and publication rate of negative results !0 ¼ 0:025 (light
green), 0:05; 0:1; 0:2; 0:4 (dark green). Panel B: a ¼ 0:2, b ¼ 0:4, and !0 ¼ 0:1 (light green), 0:3; 0:4; 0:5; 1 (dark
green). Panels C–D: similar to panels A–B, with more demanding evidentiary standards t0 ¼ 0:001 and t1 ¼ 0:999.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.006
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The step-function-like appearance of some of
the results in Figure 5, particularly Figure 5A, is
a real property of the curves in question and not
a numerical artifact. The “steps” arise because,
when evidentiary standards are weak, canoni-
zation or rejection often happens after a small
number of experiments. Because the number of
experiments must be integral, probabilities of
false canonization can change abruptly when a
small change in initial belief increases or
decreases the number of experiments in the
most likely path to canonization or rejection.
Stronger evidentiary standards do not
reduce the need to publish negative
outcomes
We have seen in the previous sections that the
scientific process struggles to distinguish true
from false claims when the rate of publishing
negative results is low. We might hope that we
could remedy this problem simply by demand-
ing more evidence before accepting a claim as
fact. Unfortunately, this is not only expensive in
terms of time and effort—sometimes it will not
even help.
Figure 6 illustrates the problem. In this fig-
ure, we see the probability of canonizing a false
claim as a function of negative publication rate
for three different evidentiary standards:
t0 ¼ 0:1, t0 ¼ 0:01, and t0 ¼ 0:001. When the
false positive rate a is relatively low (Figure 6A),
increasing the evidentiary requirements reduces
the chance of canonizing a false claim for nega-
tive publication rates above 0.1 or so, but below
this threshold there is no advantage to requiring
stronger evidence. When the false positive rate
is higher (Figure 6B), the situation is even worse:
for negative publication rates below 0.3 or so,
increasing evidentiary requirements actually
increases the chance of canonizing a false fact.
The limited benefits of strengthening eviden-
tiary standards can be understood through the
mathematical theory of random walks (Nor-
ris, 1998). In short, the thresholds of belief for
canonizing or rejecting a claim are absorbing
boundaries such that once belief attains either
boundary, the walk terminates and beliefs will
not change further. Increasing the evidentiary
standards for canonization or rejection is tanta-
mount to increasing the distance between these
boundaries and the initial belief state. Basic
results from the theory of random walks suggest
that, as the distance between the initial state
and the boundaries increases, the probability of
encountering one boundary before the other
depends increasingly strongly on the average
change in the log odds of belief at each step
(experiment), and less on the random
Figure 6. Strengthening evidentiary requirements does not necessarily decrease canonization of false facts. In
panel A, the false positive rate is a ¼ 0:05, the false negative rate is b ¼ 0:2, the original belief in the claim is
q0 ¼ 0:5, and the evidentiary standards are symmetric t1 ¼ 1! t0. In panel B, the false positive rate is increased to
a ¼ 0:25 while the other parameters remain unchanged. Particularly in this latter case, increasing evidentiary
standards does not necessarily decrease the rate at which false claims are canonized as facts.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.007
Nissen et al. eLife 2016;5:e21451. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451 10 of 19
Feature article Research Publication bias and the canonization of false facts
fluctuations in belief that arise from the stochas-
ticity of the walk. Thus, for exacting evidentiary
standards, the probability of eventual canoni-
zation or rejection depends critically on the aver-
age change in the log odds of belief for each
experiment. These are given by Equation 6 for a
true claim and Equation 7 for a false one.
Figure 7 shows how the expected change in
log odds of belief varies in response to changes
in the publication rate of negative outcomes, for
both false and true claims. Critically, for false
claims, if too few negative outcomes are pub-
lished, then on average each new publication
will increase the belief that the claim is true,
because there is a high probability this publica-
tion will report a positive result. Thus, paradoxi-
cally, scientific activity does not help sort true
claims from false ones in this case, but instead
promotes the erroneous canonization of false
claims. The only remedy for this state of affairs is
to publish enough negative outcomes that, on
average, each published result moves belief in
the “correct” direction, that is, towards canoni-
zation of true claims (a positive average change
per experiment in log odds of belief) and rejec-
tion of false ones (a negative average change
per experiment in log odds of belief).
Two additional points are in order here. First,
for true claims, under most circumstances the
expected change in the log odds of belief is
positive (Figure 7B). That is, on average, scien-
tific activity properly increases belief in true
claims, and thus the risk of incorrectly rejecting a
true claim is small (under reasonable evidentiary
standards). Second, the observation that more
exacting evidentiary standards can occasionally
increase the chance of incorrectly canonizing a
false claim is not much of an argument in favor
of weaker evidentiary standards. In short, weaker
standards cause canonization or rejection to
depend more strongly on the happenstance of
the first several published experiments. When
scientific activity tends to increase belief in a
false claim, weaker evidentiary standards appear
beneficial because they increase the chance that
a few initial published negatives will lead to
rejection and bring a halt to further investiga-
tion. While this is a logical result of the model, it
is somewhat tantamount to stating that, if scien-
tific activity tends to increase belief in false
claims, then the best option is to weaken the
dependence on scientific evidence. More robust
practices for rejecting false claims seem
desirable.
P-hacking dramatically increases the
probability of canonizing false claims
Our model has been based on the optimistic
premise that the significance levels reported in
each study accurately reflect the actual false
Figure 7. Scientific activity will tend to increase belief in false claims if too few negative outcomes are published.
Expected change in log odds of belief vs. negative publication rate for (A) false and (B) true claims. Lines show
false positive rates a ¼ 0:05 (yellow), 0:10; . . . ; 0:25 (red). Other parameter values are false negative rate b ¼ 0:2
and positive publication rate !1 ¼ 1.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.008
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positive rates. This means that there is only a 5%
chance that a false claim will yield a positive
result at the a ¼ 0:05 level.
In practice, reported significance levels can
be misleading. Questionable research practices
of all sorts can result in higher-than-reported
false positive rates; these include p-hacking
(Head et al., 2015), outcome switching
(Le Noury et al., 2015), unreported multiple
comparisons (Tannock, 1996), data dredging
(Smith and Ebrahim, 2002), HARKing—hypoth-
esizing after the results are known (Kerr, 1998),
data-dependent analysis (Gelman and Loken,
2014), and opportunistic stopping or continua-
tion (Pocock, 1987). Insufficient validation of
new technologies, or even software problems
can also drive realized error rates far above what
is expected given stated levels of statistical con-
fidence (see e.g. ref. Eklund et al., 2016).
Research groups may be positively disposed
toward their prior hypotheses or reluctant to
contradict the work of closely allied labs. Finally,
industry-sponsored clinical trials often allow the
sponsors some degree of control over whether
results are published (Kasenda et al., 2016),
resulting in an additional source of publication
bias separate from the journal acceptance
process.
To understand the consequences of these
problems and practices, we can extend our
model to distinguish the actual false positive
rate aact from the nominal false positive rate anom
which is reported in the paper and used by read-
ers to draw their inferences. We assume the
actual false positive rate is always at least as
large as the nominal rate, that is, aact ) anom. In
this scenario, the probability that a false claim
leads to a positive published outcome depends
on the actual false positive rate, i.e.,
!F ¼
aact!1
aact!1þð1!aactÞ!0
:
However, the change in belief following a
positive or negative published outcome respec-
tively depends on the nominal false positive
rate:
d1 ¼ ln
1!b
anom
! "
d0 ¼ ln
b
1!anom
! "
An inflated false positive rate makes it much
more likely that false claims will be canonized as
true facts (Figure 8). For example, suppose the
false negative rate is b¼ 0:2 and the nominal
false positive rate is anom ¼ 0:05, but the actual
false positive rate is aact ¼ 0:25. Even eliminating
publication bias against negative outcomes (i.e.,
!0 ¼ 1) and using strong evidentiary standards
does not eliminate the possibility that false
claims will be canonized as facts under these cir-
cumstances (Figure 8). Less dramatic inflation of
the false positive rate leaves open the possibility
that true vs. false claims can be distinguished,
but only if a higher percentage of negative out-
comes is published.
Increasing negative publication rates as a
claim approaches canonization greatly
increases accuracy
Thus far we have told a troubling story. Without
high probabilities of publication for negative
results, the scientific process may perform
poorly at distinguishing true claims from false
ones. And there are plenty of reasons to suspect
that negative results are not always be likely to
be published.
However, authors, reviewers, and editors are
all drawn to unexpected results that challenge
or modify prevalent views—and for a claim
widely believed to be true, a negative result
Figure 8. p-hacking dramatically increases the chances
of canonizing false claims. Probability that a false claim
is canonized as fact vs. fraction of negative outcomes.
Throughout, all positive outcomes are published
(p1 ¼ 1), and the nominal false positive rate is
anom ¼ 0:05, the false negative rate is b ¼ 0:2, and
evidentiary standards are strong (t0 ¼ 0:001 and
t1 ¼ 0:999). Curves show actual false positive rates
aact ¼ 0:05 (yellow), 0:10; . . . ; 0:25 (red). Compared with
Figure 4C, in which the nominal rates are equal to the
actual rates, the probability of canonizing a false claim
as fact is substantially higher.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.009
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from a well-designed study is surprising. As a
consequence, the probability of publishing a
negative result may be higher for claims that are
already considered likely to be true
(Silvertown and McConway, 1997;
Ioannidis, 2005)
In a simulation of point estimation by succes-
sive experimentation, de Winter and Happee
considered an even more extreme situation in
which it is only possible to publish results that
contradict the prevailing wisdom (de Winter
and Happee, 2013). They argue that this has
efficiency benefits, but their results have been
challenged persuasively by van Assen and col-
leagues (van Assen et al., 2014). In any event,
such a publication strategy would not work in
the framework we consider here, because a
claim could neither be canonized nor rejected if
each new published result were required to con-
tradict the current beliefs of the community.
Some meta-analyses have revealed patterns
consistent with this model (Poulin, 2000). For
example, when the fluctuating asymmetry
hypothesis was proposed in evolutionary ecol-
ogy, the initial publications exclusively reported
strong associations between symmetry and
attractiveness or mating success. As time
passed, however, an increasing fraction of the
papers on this hypothesis reported negative
findings with no association between these vari-
ables (Simmons et al., 1999). A likely interpreta-
tion is that initially journals were reluctant to
publish results inconsistent with the hypothesis,
but as it became better established, negative
results came to be viewed as interesting and
worthy of publication (Simmons et al., 1999;
Palmer, 2000; Jennions and Møller, 2002).
To explore the consequences of this effect,
we consider a model in which the probability of
publishing a negative outcome increases linearly
from a baseline value !b when belief in the claim
is weak, to a maximum value of !0 ¼ 1 when
belief in the claim is strong. We assume that the
probability of publishing a negative outcome is
!0 ¼ !b þ qð1! !bÞ, where !b is the baseline
probability for publishing negative outcomes,
and q is the current belief. As before, our agents
are unaware of any publication bias in updating
their own beliefs.
Figure 9 indicates that dynamic publication
rates can markedly reduce (though not elimi-
nate) the false canonization rate under many sce-
narios. In particular, Figure 9 suggests that even
if it is difficult to publish negative outcomes for
claims already suspected to be false, we can still
accurately sort true claims from false ones
provided that negative outcomes are more read-
ily published for claims nearing canonization. In
practice, this mechanism may play an important
role in preventing false results from becoming
canonized more frequently.
Discussion
In the model of scientific inquiry that we have
developed here, publication bias creates serious
problems. While true claims will seldom be
rejected, publication bias has the potential to
cause many false claims to be mistakenly canon-
ized as facts. This can be avoided only if a sub-
stantial fraction of negative results are
published. But at present, publication bias
appears to be strong, given that only a small
fraction of the published scientific literature
presents negative results. Presumably many neg-
ative results are going unreported. While this
problem has been noted before (Knight, 2003),
we do not know of any previous formal analysis
of its consequences regarding the establishment
of scientific facts.
Should scientists publish all of their
results?
There is an active debate over whether science
functions most effectively when researchers pub-
lish all of their results, or when they publish only
a select subset of their findings
Nelson et al,, 2012; de Winter and Happee,
2013; van Assen et al., 2014; McElreath and
Smaldino, 2015). In our model, we observe no
advantage to selective publication; in all cases
treated we find that false canonization decreases
monotonically with increasing publication of
negative results. This seems logical enough.
Decision theory affirms that in the absence of
information costs, withholding information can-
not on average improve performance in a deci-
sion problem such as the classification task we
treat here (Savage, 1954; Good, 1967; Ram-
sey, 1990). As Good (1967) notes, a decision-
maker “should use all the evidence already avail-
able, provided that the cost of doing so is
negligible.”
Nonetheless, several research groups have
argued that selective publishing can be more
efficient than publishing the results of all studies.
Clearly they must be implicitly or explicitly
imposing costs of some sort on the acts of pub-
lishing papers or reading them, and it can be
instructive to see where these costs lie. One
source of such costs comes simply from the
increased volume of scientific literature that
Nissen et al. eLife 2016;5:e21451. DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451 13 of 19
Feature article Research Publication bias and the canonization of false facts
ensues when all results are published; this is
sometimes known as the “cluttered office”
effect (Nelson et al., 2012). If we envision that
search costs increase with the volume of litera-
ture, for example, it may be beneficial not to
publish everything.
Another possible cost is that of actually writ-
ing a paper and going through the publication
process. If preparing a paper for publication is
costly relative to doing the experiments which
would be reported, it may be advantageous to
publish only a subset of all experimental results.
This is the argument that de Winter and Happee
make when, in a mathematical model of point
estimation, they find that selective publication
minimizes the variance given the number of pub-
lications (as opposed to the number of
experiments conducted). Note, however, that
they assume a model of science in which experi-
ments are only published when they contradict
the prevailing wisdom—and that their results
have been roundly challenged in a followup anal-
ysis ( van Assen et al., 2014).
McElreath and Smaldino (2015) analyzed a
model that is more similar to ours in structure.
As we do, they consider repeated tests of
binary-valued hypotheses. But rather than focus-
ing on a single claim at a time, they model the
progress of a group of scientists testing a suite
of hypotheses. Based on this model, McElreath
and Smaldino conclude that there can be advan-
tages to selective publication under certain
conditions.
Figure 9. Publishing a larger fraction of negative outcomes as belief increases lessens the chances of canonizing
false claims. Probability that a false claim is mistakenly canonized as a true fact vs. baseline probability of
publishing a negative outcome. The baseline probability of publishing a negative outcome is the probability that
prevails when belief in the claim is weak. The actual probability of publishing a negative outcome increases linearly
from the baseline rate when belief is 0 to a value of 1 when belief is 1. All other parameters are the same as in
Figure 4.
DOI: 10.7554/eLife.21451.010
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While selective publication certainly can ame-
liorate the cluttered office problem—observed
in their model as the flocking of researchers to
questions already shown likely to be false—we
are skeptical about the other advantages to
selective publication. McElreath and Smaldino’s
model and results appear to rely in part on their
assumption that “the only information relevant
for judging the truth of a hypothesis is its tally,
the difference between the number of published
positive and the number of published negative
findings” (p. 3).
As a mathematical claim, this is incorrect. Pre-
sumably the claim is instead intended to be a
tactical assumption that serves to simplify the
analysis. But this assumption is severely limiting.
The tally is often an inadequate summary of the
evidence in favor of a hypothesis. One can see
the problem with looking only at the tally by
considering a simple example in which false pos-
itive rates are very low, false negative rates are
high, and all studies are published. There is mild
evidence that a hypothesis is false if no positive
studies and one negative study have been pub-
lished, but there is strong evidence that the
hypothesis is true if three positive and four nega-
tive studies have been published. Yet both situa-
tions share the same tally: !1. The same
problem arises when publication bias causes
positive and negative findings to be published
at different rates.
If one is forced to use only the tally to make
decisions, an agent can sometimes make better
inferences by throwing away some of the data (i.
e., under selective publication). For example,
when false negatives are common it may be ben-
eficial to suppress some fraction of the negative
results lest they swamp any signal from true posi-
tive findings. This is not the case when the agent
has access to complete information about the
number of positive and the number of negative
results published. As a result, it is unclear whether
most of McElreath and Smaldino’s arguments in
favor of selective publication are relevant to opti-
mal scientific inference, or whether they are con-
sequences of the assumption that agents draw
their inferences based on the tally alone.
What do we do about the problem of
publication bias?
Several studies have indicated that much of the
publication bias observed in science can be
attributed to authors not writing up null results,
rather than journals rejecting null results
(Dickersin et al., 1992; Olson et al., 2002;
Franco et al., 2014). This does not necessarily
exonerate the journals; authors may be respond-
ing to incentives that the journals have put in
place (Song et al., 2000). Authors may be moti-
vated by other reputational factors as well. It
would be a very unusual job talk, promotion
seminar, or grant application that was based pri-
marily upon negative findings.
So what can we as a scientific community do?
How can we avoid canonizing too many false
claims, so that we can be confident in the verac-
ity of most scientific facts? In this paper, we have
shown that strengthening evidentiary standards
does not necessarily help. In the presence of
strong publication bias, false claims become can-
onized as fact not so much because of a few mis-
leading chance results, but rather because on
average, misleading results are more likely to be
published than correct ones.
Fortunately, this problem may be ameliorated
by several current aspects of the publication
process. In this paper, we have modeled claims
that have only one way of generating “positive”
results. For many scientific claims, e.g. those like
our Dicer example that propose particular mech-
anisms, this may be appropriate. In other cases,
however, results may be continuous: not only do
we care whether variables X and Y are corre-
lated, but also we want to know about the
strength of the correlation, for example. This
does not make the problem go away, if stronger
or highly significant correlations are seen as
more worthy of publication than weaker or non-
significant correlations. However, one advantage
of framing experimental results as continuous-
valued instead of binary is that there may be
multiple opposing directions in which a result
could be considered positive. For example, the
expression of two genes could be correlated,
uncorrelated, or anticorrelated. Both correlation
and anticorrelation might be seen as positive
results, whereas the null result of no correlation
could be subject to publication bias. But sup-
pose there is truly no effect: what does publica-
tion bias do in this case? We would expect to
see false positives in both directions. Meta-anal-
ysis would readily pick up the lack of a consistent
direction of the effect, and (if the authors avoid
mistakenly inferring population heterogeneity) it
is unlikely that correlations in either direction
would be falsely canonized as fact.
Our model assumes that research continues
until each claim is either rejected or canonized
as fact. In practice, researchers can and do lose
interest in certain claims. False claims might gen-
erate more conflicting results, or take longer to
reach one of the evidentiary thresholds; either
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mechanism could lead researchers to move on
to other problems and leave the claim as unre-
solved. If this is the case, we might expect that
instead of being rejected or canonized as fact,
many false claims might simply be abandoned.
Another possible difference between the
model and the real world is that we model the
evidentiary standards as symmetric, but in prac-
tice it may require less certainty to discard a
claim as false than it requires to accept the same
claim as fact. In this case, the probability of
rejecting false claims would be higher than pre-
dicted in our model—possibly with only a very
small increase in the probability of rejecting true
claims.
The scientific community could also actively
respond to the problem of canonizing false
claims. One of the most direct ways would be to
invest more heavily in the publication of negative
results. A number of new journals or collections
within journals have been established to special-
ize in publishing negative results. These include
Elsevier’s New Negatives in Plant Science, PLOS
One’s Positively Negative collection, Biomed
Central’s Journal of Negative Results in Biomedi-
cine, and many others (Editors, 2016). Alterna-
tively, peer reviewed publication may be
unnecessary; simply publishing negative results
on preprint archives such as the arXiv, bioRxiv,
and SocArXiv may make these results sufficiently
visible. In either case, we face an incentive prob-
lem: if researchers accrue scant credit or reward
for their negative findings, there is little reason
for them to invest the substantial time needed in
taking a negative result from a bench-top disap-
pointment to a formal publication.
Another possibility—which may already be in
play—involves shifting probabilities of publishing
negative results. We have shown that if negative
results become easier to publish as a claim
becomes better established, this can greatly
reduce the probability of canonizing false claims.
One possibility is that negative results may
become easier to publish as they become more
surprising to the community, i.e., as researchers
become increasingly convinced that a claim is
true. Referees and journal editors could make an
active effort to value papers of this sort. At pres-
ent, however, our experience suggests that neg-
ative results or even corrections of blatant errors
in previous publications rarely land in journals of
equal prestige to those that published the origi-
nal positive studies (Matosin et al., 2014).
A final saving grace is that even after false
claims are established as facts, science can still
self-correct. In this paper, we have assumed for
simplicity that claims are independent proposi-
tions, but in practice claims are entangled in a
web of logical interrelations. When a false claim
is canonized as fact, inconsistencies between it
and other facts soon begin to accumulate until
the field is forced to reevaluate the conflicting
facts. Results that resolve these conflicts by dis-
proving accepted facts then take on a special
significance and suffer little of the stigma placed
upon negative results. Until the scientific com-
munity finds more ways to deal with publication
bias, this may be an essential corrective to a pro-
cess that sometimes loses its way.
We conclude with a note on what this work
tells us about the value of science as a means of
comprehending the natural world. Science deni-
alists on both ends of the ideological spectrum
might be tempted to invoke our findings as justi-
fication for their world-views. This would be a
mistake. The facts that science denialists target
are almost always very different from the types
of facts we are modeling. We are modeling
small-scale facts of modest import, the kind that
would be established based on one or two
dozen studies and then considered settled. The
reality of anthropogenic climate change, the lack
of connection between vaccination and autism,
or the causative role of smoking in cancer are
very different. Facts of this sort have enormous
practical importance; they are supported by
massive volumes of research; and they have
been established despite well-funded groups
with powerful incentives to expose any evidence
that might give cause for skepticism. The pro-
cess by which false claims can become canon-
ized as fact in our model simply would not
operate under these circumstances.
Of all the institutions and methods that
humankind have developed to make sense of
our universe, science has proven unparalleled in
its power to generate useful models of physical
phenomena. Nothing that we have written here
changes this. The point of asking questions such
as those in the present paper is not to de-legiti-
mize science, but rather to improve the accuracy
and efficiency of scientific inquiry.
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